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1. Introduction 
Ever since minimum wage floors were first introduced to labor markets around the 
world, a perennial research question of high relevance for labor market policy has been 
how firms adjust to wage cost increases brought about by increases in the minimum 
wage. The first port of call for much of the literature has been to study the labor demand 
response of firms, and this has at various points in time generated research and policy 
controversies about what minimum wage increases do to employment or 
unemployment.1 As evidence of employment losses from minimum wage hikes has 
proven elusive in a number of settings, a smaller body of research has placed a focus 
on looking for other margins of firm adjustment. Whilst there are many such margins, 
which may differ for firms operating in different sectors, some areas considered in 
research have been the scope to pass minimum wages on in terms of higher prices (e.g. 
Aaronson and French, 2007; Lemos, 2008), whether firms cut back on wage increases 
for other higher paid workers and so reduce wage inequality (e.g. Lee, 1999; DiNardo, 
Fortin and Lemieux, 1996; Dickens and Manning, 2004) and on whether minimum 
wage increases squeeze firm profitability (e.g. Draca, Machin and Van Reenen, 2011). 
 In this paper we study minimum wage effects on firm profitability in a different 
way from the direct before/after analysis of changes in accounting profitability that 
result from minimum wage changes. Instead we study the impact of the announcement 
                                                        
1 Surveying the (mostly US time series) literature that studied data up to the late 1970s, Brown, Gilroy 
and Kohen (1982) concluded that minimum wages reduced teenage employment, but had less effect on 
adult employment. The next phase of research were the more micro-based studies of the 1990s, 
spearheaded by the Card and Krueger (1994) paper on fast food restaurants and Card and Krueger’s 
(1995) book, which both questioned the earlier findings and found no evidence of disemployment effects. 
The introduction of the UK National Minimum Wage in April 1999 also generated a number of pieces 
of research failing to find significant employment effects (see, inter alia, Machin, Manning and Rahman, 
2003, Stewart, 2002, 2004, or Dolton, Bondibene and Stops, 2015). In the US there has recently been 
another revival of research on minimum wage effects, with some focus on geography and differences 
across state borders. As before this is proving controversial on whether or not minimum wages reduce 
employment (see, inter alia, Dube, Lester and Reich, 2010 and 2016, Meer and West, 2016, or Neumark, 
Salas and Wascher, 2014). 
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of a minimum wage change on the stock market value of firms. This approach has been 
adopted in a couple of studies before, first by Card and Krueger (1995) who studied 
twenty three events in the US between 1987 and 1989 that eventually led to minimum 
wage increases in 1990 and 1991, and by Pacheco and Naiker (2006) who undertook 
an event study looking at changes in shareholder values following a significant reform 
to the youth minimum wage in New Zealand. Neither of these studies delivers very 
clear results, primarily because the nature of the ‘events’ that were examined do not 
allow for a clean event-study. Such a study would require a completely unexpected 
minimum wage change that had no uncertainty attached to its introduction. To take one 
example from Card and Krueger, on June 13, 1989 President Bush vetoed a minimum 
wage rise. The stock market reaction to this event shows no significant effect on firm 
value. But as Card and Krueger note, it is difficult to know whether this veto conveyed 
new information to the market, since the White House had promised to veto the bill 
when it was first passed by the House three months earlier. And if it did contain new 
information, how did it change the probability of a minimum wage change? 
The event studied in this paper is able to significantly improve upon such 
concerns. A completely unanticipated and sizable change in the UK minimum wage 
system was announced in the newly elected Conservative government’s emergency 
budget that was called after its election to power in May 2015. The Chancellor George 
Osborne announced that the UK government would introduce a new National Living 
Wage (NLW) of £7.20 per hour for workers aged 25 and over. Not only was this 
announcement from a right of centre government that has traditionally been against 
minimum wages, it was also totally unexpected, with other government ministers and 
the body which advises the government on minimum wages (the Low Pay Commission) 
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not knowing that it would occur.2 Thus the major advantage of our study compared to 
the other stock market reaction research in this area is that the announcement we study 
was completely unanticipated. 
 The event study approach has been very widely used in finance (see Kothari and 
Warner, 2008, or MacKinlay, 1997), but it has also been used by labor economists in 
several settings, most notably as a means of studying the effects of unions on firm 
performance.3 The seminal paper studying union effects on stock market values was by 
Ruback and Zimmerman (1984) whose event study of union representation elections 
uncovered evidence of a negative effect of union wins on the equity value of US firms. 
Subsequently, Bronars and Deere (1990) uncovered similar effects while Lee and Mas 
(2012) used a much larger sample and wider time window to find a longer run impact 
of unions on firm value. These union papers usefully inform the research design we 
adopt in our event study, but in the different setting of minimum wage changes. 
 In this paper, the differential stock market response of employers of minimum 
wage workers is compared to that of employers of higher wage workers in an event 
study setting looking at minute-by-minute changes surrounding the announcement and 
at cumulative abnormal returns in the days before and after the announcement. There is 
evidence of significant falls in the stock market value of low wage firms. Within a day 
of the budget, firm values were around 1.3 percent lower for the employers of minimum 
wage labor and ended up stabilizing around 2 to 3 percent lower after five days. Much 
of this adjustment was rapid and had happened within a couple of days. We present a 
simple calibration to give a sense of how the fall in firm value, and hence the path of 
                                                        
2 The BBC News reported that day as follows: “In a surprise announcement at the end of his speech, he 
said workers aged over 25 would be entitled to a "national living wage" from next April, to soften the 
impact of in-work benefit cuts.” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-33437115 
3 Another example of event studies in labor economics is Farber and Hallock’s (2009) analysis of the 
stock market value effects of job loss announcements. 
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future profits, compares to the size of the wage cost shock that will be induced by the 
announcement. In the light of this, the paper concludes by discussing these magnitudes 
of response in terms of longer term modes of firm adjustment to the cost shock induced 
by the minimum wage hike. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the relationship 
between minimum wages and profitability is first considered, followed by a discussion 
of the system of minimum wages that operates in the UK and then how this has altered 
following the introduction of the new National Living Wage. Section 3 describes the 
data and event study methodology.  The results are discussed in Section 4, and Section 
5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Minimum Wages, Profitability and the New National Living Wage 
Minimum Wages and Profitability 
For a competitive profit maximizing firm employing L workers at wage rate W, using 
other factors of production at price R and selling its output at price P, profits are 
maximized at Π(W, R, P). For such a firm, the derivative of the profit function with 
respect to the wage rate is ∂Π/∂W = -L(W,R,P), the negative of the demand for labor 
and the second derivative is ∂2Π/∂W2 = -∂L/∂W. The introduction of a minimum wage 
at a level M, above the prevailing wage W, reduces firm profits by
.  
Following Ashenfelter and Smith (1979), the profit reduction from a minimum 
wage increase can be approximated as: 
 
(1) 
where ΔW = M – W.  
P)R,Π(M,P)R,Π(W,ΔΠ 
2W)(
W
L
2
1
 W LΔΠ 



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The first term on the right-hand side of (1) is the wage bill effect on profits (
) and the second can be thought of as the labor demand ( ) effect 
on profits. Equation (1) can be rewritten as: 
 
 
(2) 
where < 0 is the elasticity of labor demand. 
 Equation (2) offers one way of thinking about the profit response of a firm to a 
minimum wage hike. If there is “no behavioral response”, which in this setting means 
no impact on labor demand, the second order effect in (2), ( ), is zero. The 
fall of profits that would result from the imposition of a minimum wage M is then equal 
to the proportionate change in the wage multiplied by the wage bill.  
If adjustment can occur, then the labor demand effect in the second term is non-
zero. Thus the profit loss can be ameliorated to the extent that firms can substitute away 
from low-wage workers into other factors (e.g. capital). One interesting question is the 
speed at which such adjustment could occur. In the event study setting of the empirical 
work in this paper, this is particularly interesting when one attempts to gauge the size 
of the profit reduction that can result from a change in market value (which is the 
present discounted value of firm profits).4 
In (2) the behavioral response is in terms of employment, but in other models 
mitigation of the cost shock can arise in different ways. In Aaronson and French (2007), 
for example, firms have constant marginal costs and thus a horizontal supply curve and 
                                                        
4 See also Abowd’s (1989) classic study of union wage increases and firm performance. Abowd estimates 
a version of equation (2) examining the effects of unanticipated increases in the wage bill (which he 
defines as union wealth) on the present discounted value of profits as reflected in changes in stock market 
values ( or shareholder wealth). Interestingly, the findings are unable to reject the simple no behavioral 
response model where the second order effect is zero. 
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so, irrespective of the nature of competition in the product market, the minimum wage 
increase is passed on entirely to consumers in the form of higher prices. In putty-clay 
models (like Aaronson, French and Sorkin, forthcoming) the same is true. 5  As 
Aaronson (2001) discusses, whilst the perfectly competitive model implies full-shifting 
of cost shocks through to prices, more generally the degree of shifting depends on a 
number of factors. These include the demand elasticity, the responsiveness of marginal 
cost to output and the degree of product market competition. Some other alternatives to 
adjusting prices that enable the firm to negate the negative impact on profits include 
compression of the internal wage structure, efficiency wages/productivity 
improvements and conventional labor demand responses (see, for example, Hirsch, 
Kaufman and Zelenska, 2015). 
Equation (2) also usefully illustrates the inverse relationship between a firm’s 
initial wage and the profit change. It shows that, the lower the initial wage, then the 
greater the fall in profits associated with the imposition of a minimum wage. This logic 
underpins what we do in our empirical work where we focus on the stock market 
response of employers of minimum wage workers in an event study setting. The means 
by which we define firms that employ minimum wage workers is considered in Section 
3 of the paper where we also describe the data that we use. 
Minimum Wage Setting in the UK 
 A National Minimum Wage (NMW) was introduced to the UK labor market in 
April 1999. Prior to that, minimum wages did not play a role in wage determination as 
the system that used to operate (the Wages Councils who set sectoral minima in low 
                                                        
5 See Sorkin (2015) who emphasises the distinction between modes of adjustment in the short and long 
run. Clemens and Wither (2014) also document that minimum wages take some time to be reflected in 
employment levels 
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wage sectors, only covering about 10 percent of UK workers) had been abolished by 
the Conservative government in 1993 (Dickens, Machin and Manning, 1999).  
 The rate at which the National Minimum Wage was introduced was determined 
by a body set up by the Labour government which was elected in May 1997. The Low 
Pay Commission (LPC) was instituted as an advisory body by the National Minimum 
Wage Act of 1998. The LPC has nine Commissioners, three of which are from business, 
three of which are from employee representation groups, and three are members who 
are independent from the social partners. These last three are the Chair and two 
academics who are experts in labor economics and industrial relations.  
The LPC remit is set by the government each spring, with a main focus on 
coming up with evidence-based recommendations on the main adult minimum wage 
rate and the associated age-specific minima.  The LPC assesses evidence from a wide 
range of sources (e.g. academic research, site visits, an annual consultation procedure 
with oral evidence taken from a wide range of stakeholders). It then makes 
recommendations in a report submitted to government in February, to which the 
government responds on acceptance or rejection of the recommendations, and then if 
accepted (as the main adult rate always has been since introduction) the NMW is 
uprated on October 1st.6  
 In April 1999 the National Minimum Wage was first introduced at a rate of 
£3.60 per hour for workers aged over 21, together with a youth development rate at 
£3.00 per hour for 18-21 year olds. Through time more rates have been introduced: in 
2004 a minimum wage for 16-17 year olds was introduced, and an apprentice minimum 
wage in 2010. Also in 2010 the adult rate was extended to 21 year olds, so that by 2015 
                                                        
6 For more detail on the functioning of the LPC see Brown (2002), Butcher (2012) and Metcalf (1999, 
2002). 
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there were four rates in operation: the adult minimum wage rate (now for those aged 21 
and over) which had reached £6.70 by October 2015; the youth development rate for 
18-20 year olds of £5.30; the rate for 16-17 year olds of £3.87; and the apprentice rate 
of £3.30.7 
In many quarters, the operation of the LPC has been deemed a success. The 
Institute of Government’s 2010 polling of 159 members of the Political Studies 
Association rated the NMW as the most successful government policy of the previous 
thirty years.8 This reflects the evidence-based approach leading to little in the way of 
employment losses from the NMW, and the independence of the LPC in being able to 
make its deliberations largely free from political intervention. 
The New National Living Wage 
 After being in a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats as the UK 
government in power between May 2010 and 2015, the Conservative party was elected 
outright in the May 2015 election. It called an emergency budget for July 8 2015 and 
in this budget the Chancellor George Osborne made the completely unexpected 
announcement of introducing a new National Living Wage that would raise the NMW 
for age 25 year olds and older workers by 50 pence from April 2016. The main reason 
for this was to offset the tax credit cuts that the Chancellor introduced in the budget in 
his strong programme of austerity cuts. In the Appendix we outline all the measures 
announced in the budget statement. There were a number of changes to personal 
taxation and to the taxation of dividends and corporate profits. The only changes other 
                                                        
7 The UK government has almost always accepted the LPC’s recommendations on rates. This has always 
been true for the recommendations adult, development and 16-17 year old rates. The recommendation 
on apprentice rates has twice been met with a government instituted change: first in 2011 when the LPC 
recommended a freeze of the rate but government intervened to increase it by 5 pence; then more 
markedly in 2015 when the LPC recommended raising the rate by 7 pence from £2.73 to £2.80 as the 
business secretary pushed the rate a further 50 pence up to £3.30. 
8 See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11896971. 
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than the NLW that were focused on particular businesses were a rise in insurance 
premium tax and reform of the taxation of banks – neither of which are relevant for our 
study. This gives us confidence that no other announcement in the budget had a 
significant impact on low-wage firms in particular. 
 From a political economy perspective, this is a striking and radical intervention. 
It comes from a political party that has traditionally been strongly against minimum 
wages and, indeed, which strongly opposed the introduction of the NMW in the first 
place. The very poor real wage performance of most workers in the UK labor market 
since 2008 (when median real wages have fallen by around 10 percent, but such falls 
are seen across most of the wage distribution as well) has altered this standpoint to some 
extent.9 It is true that all of the main UK political parties (including the Conservatives) 
have recognised that minimum wages are both popular amongst the general public and 
that they can play a role in raising wages (and by association living standards).10 
 The surprise of the budget announcement and the size of the wage shock is what 
we exploit in our event study of the impact on the stock market value of firms.11 The 
50 pence NLW supplement on adult minimum wages came as a complete surprise to 
the market. The Chancellor also introduced a target level for the adult minimum wage 
of £9 per hour to be reached by 2020. This was also news to the stock market, as the 
Conservative Manifesto published a month before the May 2015 election was clear in 
the aspiration of reaching £8 per hour by that date.  
                                                        
9 See Blundell, Crawford and Jin (2014) and Gregg, Machin and Fernandez-Salgado (2014) for more 
detail on the nature of real wage falls in the UK labor market. 
10 On the popularity of the UK minimum wage, a 2014 Gallup poll reported that 66 percent of those 
polled were in favour of increasing the minimum wage. 
11 In addition to being unanticipated, we noted earlier that a key additional requirement for a successful 
event study, particularly when trying to evaluate the size of any estimated effect, is that there be no 
uncertainty over the introduction of the new minimum wage. The announcement considered in this paper 
satisfies that requirement because the 1998 National Minimum Wage Act gives government ministers 
the power to set the minimum wage without reference to the LPC. The government confirmed in writing 
to the LPC on budget day that such an order would be made. 
10 
 
The introduction of the NLW also alters the role of the LPC in its future 
deliberations, as it now has a target to work to. In practical terms the government 
intervention has also effectively introduced a new age band into the structure of 
minimum wages that operate for low wage workers in the UK. This is shown in Table 
1 where the new structure of minimum wage rates that will apply from 2016 is 
compared to those of 2014 and 2015. 
 The new NLW also offers an ‘experiment’ not made possible by previous 
increases in the minimum wage coming from earlier  LPC recommendations. In due 
course, it will be interesting to study the employment and other economic effects of this 
big increase, of 10.8 percent compared to the £6.50 rate at the time of the 
announcement, or of 7.5 percent compared to the already accepted LPC rate of £6.70 
that was made effective after the budget in October 2015. By 2020, the targeted 
minimum wage of £9 is 12.5 percent higher than the £8 level that had previously been 
suggested. 
 As a result of the minimum wage changes and 2020 target, the number of 
workers in the UK labor market who are covered by the minimum is expected to rise 
significantly. Figure 1 shows actual coverage from 1999 to 2014 and expected coverage 
from 2015 onwards (defined as the number of workers paid at or below the relevant 
minimum and up to 5 pence above). There is a significant increase resulting from the 
change. In 2015, before the change, the number of covered workers had risen gradually 
to reach 1.6 million. Afterwards, due to the new NLW of April 2016 and the 2020 
target, there is a sharp increase, straight away jumping to over 2.5 million, and reaching 
3.8 million by 2020. 
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3. Data and Modelling Approach 
Data 
The principal sample frame of firms for our analysis is made up of the constituents of 
the FTSE All-Share Index. This index comprises eligible companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange main market that pass screenings for liquidity and 
investability. The index captures 98 percent of the UK’s market capitalization. We 
exclude from our analysis all investment trusts and private equity funds, giving a final 
set of 442 firms, with a mean (median) market capitalization of £3.1bn (£599mn).  
We have daily prices, total returns and volume from Datastream. We also 
extract daily data on market capitalization, dividend yield and the price-book ratio. 
Trade-level data for the announcement date are taken from Bloomberg. These data 
contain the price, volume and exact time of every trade during the official trading day 
(8am to 4.30pm). We use this data to compute the volume-weighted price for each stock 
by minute of the trading day. 
Treatment Firms 
To estimate the effect of the increase of the minimum wage on market values, 
we need to identify a subset of firms from the entire sample of 442 firms that are 
exposed to the treatment. Our principal results follow the approach of Draca, Machin 
and Van Reenen (2011) by using accounting information on the average wage of the 
firm to sort firms. The annual accounts report the total wage and salary costs for the 
firm and the average number of employees. This gives us a measure of the average 
annual wage per employee. Since the new minimum wage is set at £7.20, a worker who 
is employed full-year full-time would earn £14,976.  
We therefore first identify the quoted firms in our sample who are expected to 
be affected by the minimum wage announcement on the basis of their average wage per 
12 
 
employee being less than £15,000 per year. The strength of this identification approach 
depends on the extent to which minimum wage workers are concentrated in firms at the 
lower end of the wage distribution. Unfortunately, firms are not required to report any 
information on the distribution of wages within the firm, only the average wage. We 
also require that the firm has a majority of its employees based in the UK. Some of the 
low average wage firms are predominantly operating in low-wage economies, but have 
chosen to list on the London stock exchange. Clearly these firms are not affected by the 
UK minimum wage. Our final sample of NMW firms comprises the twenty companies 
that are listed (grouped by sector) in the Appendix. Together, these 20 firms employ 
over 600,000 workers. 
To assess the usefulness of the identification approach we adopt, we study a 
different data source looking at the segregation of wages across firms in the UK using 
the 2013 cross-section of the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) and the 
Annual Business Survey (ABS). These are matched worker-firm level data that allows 
us to look at within-firm wage distributions (for a one percent sample of workers) and 
explore the association between average wages and the intensity of low-wage workers. 
We have a sample of 63,770 workers employed in the private sector who can be 
matched to firm-level data (7,803 firms) that includes the average wage per employee.  
We follow the Low Pay Commission procedure of defining a minimum wage 
worker as any worker who receives an hourly wage (excluding overtime) that is up to 
five pence above the minimum wage effective at the time of the survey (April 2013). 
Overall, 6.2 percent of our sample are minimum wage workers. This is very similar to 
the 7 percent figure reported for all private sector workers in the UK in the 2014 Low 
Pay Commission report (page 22). Our final restriction is that firms must employ at 
13 
 
least 100 workers and have an average wage of at least £5,000.12 These two sample 
restrictions reduce our sample to 60,990 workers (and 5,850 firms), but the share of 
minimum-wage jobs remains at 6.2 percent.  
In Figure 2, we plot the proportion of minimum-wage workers in a firm against 
the firm’s average annual wage for those firms with an average wage below £30,000 
(40,046 workers in 3,684 firms). We split the sample into average wage ventiles, with 
a sample of 184 firms in each bin. There is clearly a strong decline in the proportion of 
minimum-wage workers as the average wage rises. Only for those bins to the left of the 
£15,000 cutoff are at least 10 percent of the workforce on the minimum wage. On 
average, 21 percent of workers in firms with an average wage of less than £15,000 are 
minimum-wage workers.  Alternatively, one can note that 75 percent of minimum-wage 
workers work in firms that have average annual wages of less than £15,000.  
These figures probably underestimate the impact of the minimum wage on our 
treatment group of 20 firms, because they reflect the average share of minimum-wage 
workers across all industries. Our treatment group however is heavily focused on two 
particular industries, namely Retail Trade and Accommodation and Food Service 
activities. As the second row of Table 2 shows, if we further restrict the ASHE/ABS 
sample to focus on these two industries, 26.0 percent of workers in firms with an 
average wage of less than £15,000 are minimum-wage workers.  
Event Study Methodology 
We follow the by now standard approach in the finance literature to estimate 
the effect of the minimum wage change on a firm’s equity value. We compute the 
                                                        
12 We do this only to ensure that the ASHE/ABS sample of firms are more similar to the firms in the 
FTSE All-Share index, which naturally tend to be larger employers. Note that amongst the low-wage 
firms in our treatment sample, none would be eliminated on the basis of these two restrictions. 
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abnormal return as the difference between a stock’s actual return and the expected 
return. For firm i at time t, the abnormal return is simply: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑟𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡] (3) 
where rit is the actual realized return and is E[rit|Xt] is the expected return, with Xt 
denoting the information set at time t.  
We consider a number of alternative specifications for 𝐸[𝑟𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡]. Perhaps the 
most common approach is to use the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to estimate 
the sensitivity of the ith firm’s return to a market index (i.e. 𝑋𝑡 is the market return) and 
use the predicted values as an estimate of the expected return. This approach is adopted 
by Ruback and Zimmerman (1984), Card and Krueger (1995) and Lee and Mas (2012). 
To implement this, we estimate a daily return model of the form: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (4) 
where rmt is the return on the equal-weighted FTSE All Share index (i.e. the 442 
companies excluding investment trusts and private equity funds). The market model is 
estimated over a twelve-month period up to the 15th April 2015, which is 60 days prior 
to the minimum wage announcement. The abnormal return from the CAPM model is 
then simply: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑡) (5) 
It is well-known however that the cross-section of stock returns can be predicted 
by more than simply the market return (Fama and French, 1992). We therefore also 
present results using a four-factor model for expected returns that includes the market 
return, a size return based on market capitalization, a value return based on dividend 
yield and a momentum return.13 
                                                        
13 For the four-factor model, we estimate each factor return by allocating all stocks in the FTSE All-
Share index (excluding investment trusts) into (a) a large, medium and small-cap portfolio based on the 
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One further factor that could affect our results is that, as we have already shown, 
firms with sizeable minimum wage exposure tend to be heavily distributed in certain 
industries that employ more low wage workers such as retail, hotels, restaurants and 
bars. Evidence suggests that stock returns have an important industry component 
(Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999; Fama and French, 1997) and if, by chance, these 
particular industries experienced abnormal returns relative to the market since the 
announcement date for reasons unrelated to the minimum wage, we would ascribe those 
returns to the minimum wage announcement. The expected return definition used above 
will not account for this. We therefore also construct two-digit SIC industry returns 
(excluding the minimum wage firms themselves) and use these as our measure of 
expected returns. So in our main results we consider estimates of abnormal returns from 
three alternative models: (1) the CAPM, (2) a four-factor model and (3) a 2-digit 
industry model. 
 
4. Results 
In this section we discuss the results of our analysis. We begin by presenting minute- 
by-minute evidence to demonstrate the strong reaction of our minimum wage sample 
to the exact announcement time of the minimum wage increase. We then examine the 
subsequent daily abnormal returns. Finally we present evidence from a regression 
model that suggests a significant ability of the market to isolate minimum wage firms 
from other, arguably similar, firms. 
Intra-day Announcement Effects 
                                                        
30th and 70th percentile rank on the previous trading day, (b) a high, medium and low dividend yield 
portfolio based on the 30th and 70th percentile rank on the previous trading day and (c) a high, medium 
and low momentum portfolio based on the 30th and 70th percentile rank on the previous trading day of 
returns over the period 126-21 days prior to the ranking. We then generate daily factor returns by taking 
the difference between the two extreme portfolios for each factor. See Dube, Kaplan and Naidu (2011) 
for another example of an event study using factor models. 
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The Chancellor of the Exchequer began the budget statement at 12:33 on July 
8th. At 13:35, he announced the decision to raise the minimum wage, one hour and two 
minutes into the speech. He concluded the speech four minutes later, at 13:39. We can 
therefore exploit the intra-day price change in our sample to examine whether there was 
any difference in returns between the NMW firms and the non-NMW firms prior to the 
announcement time (13:35) and whether there was a subsequent divergence. We have 
minute-by-minute data on the trade price and volume traded of each stock. We present 
results for both the equal-weighted index of NMW firms and a value-weighted index 
that accounts for the very different trading volumes that are present in the intra-day 
data. 
To motivate the analysis, Figure 3 shows minute-by-minute share price moves 
for three of our low wage firms from the market open on budget day to 24 hours after 
the NLW announcement. The three firms are a retail firm (Home Retail Group), a pub 
group (JD Wetherspoon) and a hospitality firm (The Restaurant Group). In all three 
cases, there is a marked dramatic drop in their share prices at the precise time that the 
minimum wage announcement was made. The initial drop within half an hour was of 
the order of 2-3 percent and was broadly sustained for the rest of the trading day.  On 
market opening at 8:00 AM the next day, the pub group JD Wetherspoon took another 
hit dropping a further 2 percent, presumably as the market had more time overnight to 
absorb and assess the information contained in the announcement. 
Analysis of the whole sample of NMW firms is provided in Table 3. Panel A 
gives the minute-by-minute cumulative abnormal returns (CAR (X, Y)) for the NMW 
stocks from the time of announcement (X = A) over the subsequent Y minutes. In Panel 
B we report the pre-announcement returns (as far back as 24 hours before). The 
abnormal returns are calculated for a market model (i.e. adjusting returns for the overall 
17 
 
market return over the same period) and for the two-digit industry model. The first two 
columns of results use equal-weighting, whilst the final two columns are value-
weighted. Figure 4 displays the cumulative raw returns to the NMW and non-NMW 
stocks from the beginning of the trading day to 24-hours after the announcement.14  
For the pre-announcement effects, there are two key points. First, there was 
essentially no trend in the market in the hours prior to the budget and no significant 
difference between the NMW and non-NMW stocks. Second, all of the budget 
announcements prior to the minimum wage announcement had very little effect on 
market prices and almost no effect on the relative performance of the two groups of 
firms. This is consistent with the evidence in Section 2 that other announcements in the 
budget were not directed at low-wage firms in particular. 
From 13:35 onward, the picture became very different. There was a sharp fall 
in the price of NMW stocks. One hour on from the announcement, the NMW firms on 
average experienced a fall of as much as 69bp relative to the market on an equal-
weighted basis, and 176bp on a value-weighted basis.15 Although these effects weaken 
as the trading day finished, all observations on the average abnormal returns of the 
NMW firms are negative from the announcement time. Moreover, on market opening 
the day after budget day, the gap significantly widens again as Figure 4 makes very 
clear, so that 24 hours after the NLW announcement the fall in cumulative abnormal 
returns is around 1.3 percent. Overall, we take this as strong evidence that the decline 
in NMW prices relative to non-NMW prices occurred as a direct result of the minimum 
                                                        
14 The gap between the two - the abnormal return - with associated 95 percent confidence intervals is 
shown in Figure A1 in the Appendix. 
15 Note that the smaller equal-weighted as compared to value-weighted returns reflect the fact that two 
very small firms in our NMW sample (Game Digital and Card Factory) had price gains during the 
afternoon on very small trading volumes. 
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wage announcement and was not as a consequence of other Budget changes (or indeed 
other events in the market).16  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Having demonstrated an intra-day response to the minimum wage 
announcement, we now turn to consider daily cumulative abnormal returns from the 
announcement day onward. We compute these equal-weighted cumulative abnormal 
returns from day X to day Y as CAR(X, Y) = ∑ ARit
t=Y
t=X . So for example denoting X=A 
as announcement time, CAR(A, 10) measures the cumulative abnormal return on the 
NMW stocks for the post-announcement part of Budget day and the first ten trading 
days from then. We use three expected return models: (1) the CAPM model, (2) a 4-
factor model and (3) a two-digit industry-matched model.  
Figure 5 plots the CAR (using the industry-matched model for returns) with 
associated 95 percent confidence intervals for the 10 days either side of the 
announcement.17 We study daily returns for a 10-day window since the announcement 
is clear and public, so we would expect the market to re-price reasonably fast. Longer 
horizons are increasingly likely to bring in other events not related to the NLW that 
may shift abnormal returns for treatment firms. We do however comment below on 
estimated CARs for up to three months after the announcement.  
The decline over the announcement day and the following day, CAR(A, 1), is 
in the range -1.4 to -1.7 percent, depending on the expected return model we adopt. 
Over the five-day period, the decline is between -2.1 percent and -3.0 percent. At this 
point, the decline seems to have stabilized, since there is at most an additional 20bp 
                                                        
16 Figure A2 of the Appendix shows a placebo-type experiment by plotting the equal-weighted 
abnormal returns for the NMW firms for every 24-hour period (measured from 13:35 to 13:34 on the 
subsequent day) from 1st May up to and including the budget day (47 observations).  It shows the 
decline observed after the NLW announcement at -1.30% was by far the largest abnormal return 
observed across all 47 observations (the rest are mostly clustered in the ± 0.5% range).  
17 The mean CARs from the three expected return models are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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decline over the subsequent five days. This suggests that the market reacted quickly to 
the announcement, with around one-half to three-quarters of the adjustment occurring 
by the end of the first-day after the Budget. All the estimated negative cumulative 
returns are statistically significant at the 5 percent level or better. 
As already noted, other events may start to impact the estimated CARs as the 
time window is extended further. That said, when we did widen the window and 
estimate a twenty- and sixty-day CAR, we obtained estimates (and associated standard 
errors) of -2.919 (1.884) and -3.968 (3.755) for the industry-matched model. The 
significantly reduced precision of these estimates is not at all surprising, but the 
magnitude does show that the significant fall experienced within the first few days of 
the announcement appears to be permanent.  
Possible Small Sample Issues 
As with other event studies, small sample issues may lead to possible biases. 
The first concerns the relatively small number of firms in the treatment group and the 
volatility of returns for some of the less traded firms. To consider this, we have therefore 
also estimated CARs for the median firm at each horizon and by trimming the two 
highest and lowest CARs within the sample of twenty firms in the same way as before. 
The results for the five-day horizon are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. All these 
alternative approaches continue to show significantly negative effects – though the 
point estimates are somewhat less negative in general. We also find that 15 of the 20 
firms in the NMW portfolio have a negative abnormal return five-days after the 
announcement (regardless of expected return model). Using 18 months of pre-
announcement data, we find that for this sample of 20 firms, such a large number of 
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negative returns across the portfolio lies outside the 95 percent empirical confidence 
interval.18 
Regression Based Analysis 
 In a final analysis of the returns data, we examine the cross-section of all post-
announcement abnormal returns for the full sample of 442 firms. We are interested 
primarily here in whether there is evidence to suggest that the market was able to 
accurately identify the firms most at risk from the minimum wage rise and whether our 
identification approach to minimum-wage firms is plausible given the market response. 
 Table 4 reports some regression results for this cross-section of returns for the 
five-days following the announcement (results that prove qualitatively similar for ten-
day returns are given in Appendix Table A3). We use the CAPM model to estimate 
expected returns, but the results are robust to using any of the alternative return models 
considered before. In column (1) we simply report the coefficient on a dummy if the 
firm was in our NMW sample. The coefficient of -2.131 on this dummy is of course 
equal to the mean abnormal return after five-days we reported earlier (see Figure 5 and 
Appendix Table A1). In column (2) we additionally add controls for 2-digit industry, 
market-capitalization size quintile and pre-announcement returns. These controls 
marginally increase the size of the estimated negative effect for the NMW firms to -
2.331.19  
                                                        
18 A second possible issue is that the distribution of cumulative abnormal returns may not be normally 
distributed. We therefore also undertook a non-parametric analysis where we estimated CARs in an 
estimation window that predates the NLW announcement. As one example, we estimated five-day 
industry-matched CARs based on daily data from September 2013 through April 2015 and considered 
their distributions. The 5th percentile CAR was -1.59 and the 95th percentile CAR was +1.73; the 1st 
percentile was -2.67 and the 99th percentile +2.34. Our estimated CAR of -3.047 is clearly more negative 
than the 99th percentile (with an empirical p-value of 0.002). 
19 Adding additional controls to this specification - (i) dividends per share, (ii) assets per share, (iii) price-
book ratio, (iv) sales per worker and (v) return on equity – resulted in a very similar coefficient (standard 
error) of -2.477 (0.974). 
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 In the subsequent three columns, we examine the extent to which the market 
reaction was discriminating. In column (3) we consider whether the negative 
cumulative returns for the NMW sample are merely a result of a more general decline 
for lower-wage firms. Since we use the cutoff of less than £15,000 average wage to 
identify the NMW firms, we consider whether firms in the £15-20k, £20-25k and £25-
30k average wage bracket experienced any similar pattern (with £30k+ being the 
omitted group). There is no evidence to support this idea, suggesting that the market 
focused closely on the lowest-wage firms.  
In column (4) we divide the NMW sample into two equal-sized groups of 10 
firms. One group, termed NMW High Wage Bill Shock, are those firms in which the 
wage bill (as a fraction of total costs) is above the median, and the second group, NMW 
Low Wage Bill Shock, are those for which it is below the median. Assuming all our 
firms are hit by the same percentage wage bill increase, this should be more problematic 
for those firms in which wages are a larger share of costs. So we would expect the 
cumulative abnormal returns to be more negative for the NMW High Wage Bill Shock 
group, and this is exactly what we find – the magnitudes are quite different in numerical 
terms and the difference is significant at the 7% level. 
In the final column of the Table we consider variations in the stock market 
response for firms with different degrees of market power. To do so, we therefore 
calculated the gross profit margin for each of our 20 NMW firms (using the average 
over the prior three years) to generate a Lerner Index. We then divided the NMW 
sample into two equal-sized groups of 10 firms depending on whether they have a high 
or low Lerner Index. The results show that the abnormal returns were more negative 
for those facing a more competitive environment. This is in line with the notion that 
firms with more market power see smaller stock market responses because they have 
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greater scope to absorb the wage cost shock by means of one of the possible adjustments 
we discussed earlier (we return to this issue again below).20 
Gauging the Impact on Profitability 
Finally we turn to an analysis of the magnitude of the estimates that we have 
obtained, considering their plausibility in terms of the implied profit effect in the light 
of the model of Section 2 which allows for a behavioral response that can act to mitigate 
the wage bill shock over time. As has already been noted, the mitigation can be enabled 
through a variety of possible adjustments, including passing on the cost shock to 
consumers through higher prices, by reductions in non-wage compensation, 
productivity or service quality improvements, wage compression within the firm and 
substitution of other factors for low wage labor. 
To begin with, consider the sample of firms that have an average wage of less 
than £15,000 in the matched worker-firm data discussed in Section 3. We noted above 
that for the two principal industries in our equity sample, 26 percent of workers in these 
firms are minimum-wage workers. To evaluate the impact of a minimum-wage hike for 
these firms, we start by noting that for the low-wage firms in these industries, 
minimum-wage workers account for 21 percent of the wage bill. This of course is lower 
than their share of employment since they are by definition the lowest paid workers in 
the firm. So the simple direct effect of increasing the minimum wage by 10 percent for 
these workers would generate a wage bill rise of 2.1 percent.  
But this calculation ignores two additional effects. First, all workers currently 
above the minimum wage but who would fall below the new minimum wage, must have 
their wages raised to at least the new minimum. 27 percent of workers are in this group, 
                                                        
20 For 299 of our 442 firms we were also able to look at a minimum wage exposure variable when we 
were able to match to our firms from the ASHE and ABS data described above. The results are shown in 
Appendix Table A4 and overall reconfirm the pattern of results that we obtained from the larger sample. 
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and to raise their wages at least to the new minimum adds an additional 1.3 percent to 
the wage bill, giving an overall increase of 3.4 percent. Second, it is usually assumed 
that workers seek to protect their relativities following a minimum wage increase.21 A 
simple method of capturing this is to assume that workers on the old minimum wage 
get the full 10 percent increase and that all workers within 20 percent of the old 
minimum receive some wage increase on a smoothly-sliding scale that maintains wage 
rank order, places everyone at least at the new minimum and tapers the minimum wage 
effect to vanish for all workers with wages already above 10 percent of the new 
minimum. This gives a total wage bill increase of 4.1 percent. We would argue that this 
suggests a fairly tight bound on the wage bill effect of the increase, for the average firm 
in our sample, to be between 3 and 4 percent.  
How reasonable is this calculation? Perhaps the best evidence comes directly 
from one of the firms in our NMW sample. Next plc (a large clothes retailer) released 
its half-yearly report in September 2015. They provided a detailed calculation of the 
impact of the NLW on their wage bill. By 2020, the firm estimated that the wage bill 
would be £27m higher as a result of paying the NLW (including the associated costs of 
maintaining relativities) on a total wage bill of £720m, or 3.8 percent.  
Table 5 calibrates the impact of this scale of wage bill shock on firm profits. We 
use data from the last three annual reports of the 20 firms in our equity sample. All 
these reports predate the minimum wage announcement. We normalize sales to be 100 
and compute the average for each firm of the wage bill and pre-tax profits. The figures 
in column (1) report the baseline. On average, the wage bill is equal to 18.6 percent of 
                                                        
21 This indirect effect is often termed a spillover or ‘ripple’ effect. Dube, Galiano and Leonard (2015) 
use payroll data from an individual firm in the US to suggest that this ripple effect is observed for workers 
earning up to 15 percent above a newly implemented Federal minimum wage. For other work on 
spillovers based on individual-level microdata see Autor, Manning and Smith (2016) for the US or 
Dickens and Manning (2004) for the UK. 
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total sales and the pre-tax profit equals 6.0 percent. This is a relatively low profit 
margin, though is common for firms in these sectors. We focus on pre-tax profits 
because we assume that any hit to the wage bill feeds through all the profit measures 
e.g. firms cannot for example alter their financing costs to offset the wage bill rise. With 
a real interest rate of 3 percent, a pre-tax profit of 6 gives a present value of 206.22  
Now consider a rise in the minimum wage of 10 percent (the average rise over 
the next four years) that raises the wage bill by 4 percent (column (2)). Assuming no 
offsetting effects, pre-tax profits fall by 12 percent. If this rise in the wage bill is 
permanent (i.e. no subsequent reduction in the minimum wage) and there are no 
offsetting effects, the present value of the firm drops by 12.4 percent to 180.5. 
Alternatively, suppose that the firm takes the hit in full for five years but then 
successfully generates fully offsetting effects elsewhere on the income statement. Then 
firm value declines by 1.6 percent.  
We can also evaluate the size of the response in terms of variable exposure to 
the minimum wage. According to our estimates (reported in Table A4), a firm with a 
10 percent higher share of minimum-wage workers experienced an additional estimated 
94bp fall in value. In the final column of Table 5, we show that a firm employing 40 
percent minimum wages workers (10 percentage points above the baseline), would 
experience a decline in present value of 17 percent. Again assuming full offset in the 
medium-run, the drop in firm value is predicted to be 2.3 percent, 70bp more than for 
the baseline firm. This closely matches the estimate from our empirical analysis. 
                                                        
22 Averaging over the first half of 2015 (i.e. prior to the Minimum Wage announcement), the nominal 
yield on the Bank of America ML sterling-denominated UK corporate bond index was 3.5%. Given an 
inflation target of 2% that appears well-anchored (given the forward inflation rates implied by the swap 
market), this implies a real rate of 1.5%. We use a somewhat higher nominal yield of 5% (the average 
over the previous five years) to reflect the seemingly abnormally low nominal yields in recent years. 
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Whilst these numbers are inevitably somewhat back-of-the-envelope, they do 
suggest that the size of the effect we have estimated in our empirical work (a 2-3 percent 
decline) is consistent with the market believing that firms will be able to substantially 
offset the costs of the minimum wage. Crucially, our estimates appear inconsistent with 
there being a large, permanent effect on firm profits where employers are entirely 
unable to adjust to respond to the additional wage costs induced by the minimum wage 
increase. 23  The evidence we have reported on heterogeneity in the stock market 
response is supportive of this in that the market penalized some firms more than others, 
with smaller share price falls occurring for those that are likely to be more able to adjust 
(e.g. those facing a smaller wage bill shock, or with a higher pre-NLW Lerner index).  
It is clear why firms that face a smaller wage bill shock should be less affected. 
By contrast, it is less clear how to interpret a lower impact for those higher pre-NLW 
Lerner index firms operating in a less competitive environment. One possibility is that 
such firms may be thought to have more organizational slack and so have more scope 
to offset the wage shock through increased efficiencies (Nickell, 1996). Alternatively, 
they may be able to reduce rents paid to other workers to offset the cost.  
Whilst these are plausible modes of adjustment, as already discussed in Section 
2 much of the literature has focused on price adjustment in response to minimum wages. 
However, theoretical models of minimum wages and prices are not very clear on what 
kind of scope there is for price adjustment for firms in different competitive 
environments. The fact that our 20 firms are a particular selected group of firms, mostly 
operating in relatively competitive industries and all with positive profit margins, 
makes it even harder to link the Lerner index findings to particular models where price 
                                                        
23  They certainly run counter to the observation made in September 2015 by the President of the 
Confederation of British Industry, Paul Drechsler, that “I’ve talked to several chief executives and been 
surprised by the impact on their profits. In one [big] company, it would wipe out all of their profits” 
[Financial Times, September 8 2016].  
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pass through would occur. Because of this ambiguity, and the absence of any data on 
firm-level prices, we next discuss what the firms in our sample actually state their 
possible response to the NLW introduction would be. 
So what do the firms say they will do to actually mitigate the NLW wage bill 
shock in practice? To examine this, we look at corporate reports issued since the 
announcement that have commented on the NLW introduction. At the time of writing, 
nine firms in our sample have released reports that discuss the NLW. The text of 
statements pertaining to the NLW are reported in section C of the Appendix. 
Consideration of the statements make clear two things.  First of all, to varying degrees, 
they all expect to be able to significantly mitigate the effects of the rise in the wage bill. 
Second, the margin of adjustment seems highly unlikely to be employment. In fact, 
none of the nine say they anticipate employment reductions in response to the NLW. 
Instead, the nine company statements focus on other margins of adjustment to 
the wage shock that the NLW will induce. Factors mentioned include increasing prices, 
raising productivity and increasing cost efficiency. Most mentioned is the idea that the 
cost increases will be passed on in terms of higher prices (or termed inflationary 
pressure in some of the reports). For example, Next plc (whose half-yearly report we 
have referred to above) say that a 1 percent increase in product price over the next four 
years would completely offset their additional wage costs from the National Living 
Wage.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Based on a stock market event study, the empirical research presented in this paper 
describes what happened to the market value of firms employing minimum wage 
workers when a completely unexpected announcement of raising the minimum wage 
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occurred. The setting is an emergency budget that was called promptly after the new 
election of a right of centre government in the UK. The UK Chancellor of the Exchequer 
made a surprise announcement on budget day (July 8 2015) that he would introduce a 
new National Living Wage some 11 percent higher than the prevailing National 
Minimum Wage for workers aged 25 and above. 
 The impact of the announcement is studied both intra-day and for up to ten days 
either side of the announcement. Unlike the work on stock market responses to 
minimum wages in other settings, where the unanticipated nature and certainty of the 
announced rises are much less precise than in our setting, we find there to be a 
significant, though modestly sized, impact on the stock market values of the large 
quoted companies we study. The size of this reduction in firm value resulting from the 
NLW announcement is compared to the fall in profitability in response to the wage cost 
shock that will be induced by the announcement and is seen to be of a comparable 
magnitude, when allowing for firms to adjust so as to mitigate the wage bill shock 
resulting from the minimum wage hike over time. Thus the announcement of the NLW 
introduction had the impact of significantly reducing the expected profits of UK 
publicly-quoted firms prior to its implementation in April 2016.   
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Figure 1:  
Actual and Estimated Minimum Wage Coverage, 1999-2020 
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Notes: Low Pay Commission calculations from Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) 
from 1999 to 2014 and from 2015 onwards using wage forecasts from ASHE 2014. Paid at or 
below the minimum is based upon the Low Pay Commission procedure of defining a minimum-
wage worker as any worker who receives an hourly wage (excluding overtime) that is up to five 
pence above the minimum wage effective at the time of the survey 
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Figure 2:  
Minimum Wage Shares and Firm Average Wages 
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Notes: The y-axis shows the proportion of minimum-wage workers in the firm. The x-axis shows 
the average annual wage in the firm divided into bins of 5 percentiles from lowest (left) to highest 
(right) – a total of 20 bins for annual wages from £5,000 to £30,000. Derived from matched 
worker-firm data (40,046 workers in 3,684 firms) from the 2013 Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings (ASHE) and the Annual Business Survey (ABS). 
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Figure 3: Examples of Share Price Movements of NMW Firms 
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Figure 4: 
Returns On Budget Day and 24 Hours After The NLW Announcement 
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Notes: Based on 442 FTSE All-Share Index (excluding investment trusts) quoted firms, 
comprising the 20 NMW firms and 422 Non-NMW firms.  The 20 NMW firms are listed in the 
Appendix. 
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Figure 5:  
Daily Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
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Notes: Based on 442 FTSE All-Share Index (excluding investment trusts) quoted firms, 
comprising the 20 NMW firms and 422 Non-NMW firms.  The 20 NMW firms are listed in the 
Appendix. Cumulative abnormal returns for the NMW firms are measured using a 2-digit 
industry return index as the expected return measure. The announcement date (Day 0) was budget 
day on July 8 2015, with the announcement A occurring at 13:35, two-thirds of the way through 
the trading day. 
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TABLE 1. AGE VARIATIONS IN MINIMUM WAGES, 2014-2016 
 
 
 
Uprating Date 
 
October 2014 
 
 
October 2015 
 
April 2016 
 
 
Decision Process and Date 
 
Government Accepted 
Low Pay Commission 
Recommendations in 
March 2014 
 
 
Government Accepted 
Low Pay Commission 
Recommendations in 
March 2015 
 
Chancellor Introduced 
National Living Wage 
For 25+ Workers in 
July 2015 Budget 
    
Adult NMW, Age 21+ 6.50 6.70  
Adult NMW, Age 21-24   6.70 
Adult NLW, Age 25+   7.20 
Youth NMW, Age 18-20 5.13 5.30 5.30 
Youth NMW, Age 16-17 3.79 3.87 3.87 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2. MINIMUM WAGE SHARES AND FIRM AVERAGE WAGES 
 
       
  Firms with 
Average 
Wage 
≥£15,000 
 
  Firms 
with 
Average 
Wage 
<£15,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No of 
Firms 
 
Mean 
Wage 
 
Share of 
MW 
workers 
 
No of 
Firms 
 
Mean 
Wage 
 
Share of 
MW 
workers 
 
       
All 
 
 
NMW-Intensive 
Sectors 
 
Non-NMW 
Intensive Sectors 
 
4613 
 
 
278 
 
 
4337 
 
 
 
34,986 
 
 
22,446 
 
 
35,789  
0.024 
 
 
0.067 
 
 
0.022 
 
 
1237 
 
 
422 
 
 
817 
 
10,760 
 
 
10,724 
 
 
10,777 
 
 
0.213 
 
 
0.260 
 
 
0.189 
 
 
Notes: Derived from matched worker-firm data (60,990 workers in 5,850 firms) from the 2013 Annual 
Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) and the Annual Business Survey (ABS). The NMW-Intensive 
Sectors are Retail Trade and Accommodation and Food Serving.  
 
 
  
Notes: From Low Pay Commission annual reports and July 2015 budget. 
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TABLE 3. ESTIMATES OF INTRA-DAY CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
 Equal-Weighted 
 
Value-Weighted 
 
 
(1) 
Market  
Model   
  
          
(2)  
Industry- 
Matched 
Model 
 
 
(3) 
Market  
Model 
(4) 
Industry- 
Matched  
Model 
 
 
Panel A: NMW Firms – Post-Announcement 
 
CAR(A,20)      -0.342** 
  (0.131) 
 
 -0.271* 
 (0.125) 
    -1.419** 
  (0.551) 
 
   -1.246** 
 (0.537) 
CAR(A,60)      -0.694** 
  (0.238) 
    -0.638** 
(0.242) 
    -1.759** 
 (0.681) 
   -1.564** 
(0.662) 
     
CAR(A,120)   -0.469 
   (0.288) 
 
-0.575 
 (0.312) 
      -1.495** 
   (0.447) 
 
   -1.408** 
 (0.425) 
CAR(A, Market Close)   -0.280 
   (0.323) 
 
 -0.262 
  (0.334) 
   -0.996* 
  (0.495) 
 
-0.815 
 (0.491) 
 
CAR(A, 24 Hours)     -1.300** 
  (0.491) 
    -1.420** 
  (0.519) 
     -2.019** 
  (0.196) 
    -1.997** 
(0.209) 
     
 
Panel B: NMW Firms – Pre-Announcement 
 
CAR(-20,A)  -0.040 
  (0.045) 
 
 -0.121* 
 (0.054) 
 0.034 
 (0.038) 
 
-0.080 
 (0.040) 
CAR(Budget Start, A)  -0.023 
  (0.089) 
 
-0.054 
 (0.093) 
0.149 
 (0.086) 
 
0.086 
(0.075) 
CAR(Market Open, A)  -0.183 
  (0.368) 
 
   0.038 
   (0.363) 
 -0.164 
  (0.159) 
 
0.298 
(0.139) 
CAR(24 Hours, A)  -0.103 
  (0.313) 
  -0.279 
   (0.334) 
 -0.280 
   (0.201) 
-0.365 
         (0.212) 
     
        
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: CAR(A, Y) denotes the cumulative abnormal return from announcement time A (13:35) to minute Y 
relative to the announcement time. There are 20 firms in the NMW sample. Panel A reports results for the 
post-announcement period and Panel B reports results for the pre-announcement period. The market closed 
175 minutes after the announcement, it opened 334 minutes before the announcement and the budget began 
62 minutes before the announcement. The cumulative abnormal return for each firm is equal-weighted in 
columns (1) and (2) and weighted by their share of the total value of all trades in NMW stocks over the 
relevant period in columns (3) and (4).  
** denotes significance at 1 percent level; * denotes significance at 5 percent level. 
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TABLE 4. REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF FIVE-DAY ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
 
 
(1) 
          
(2)  
 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
 
NMW    -2.131* 
  (0.895) 
 
  -2.331* 
 (0.943) 
    -2.266* 
   (1.032) 
 
  
NMW High Wage 
Bill Shock 
     
 
     
 
     
 
  -4.077* 
 (1.736) 
 
      
NMW Low Wage 
Bill Shock 
 
      -0.792 
  (0.968) 
 
 
NMW Low Lerner 
Index 
    -3.868* 
(1.722) 
      
NMW High Lerner 
Index 
 
    -0.741 
(0.965) 
Average Wage £15-
20k 
     
 
 -0.196 
  (0.909) 
 
-0.215 
 (0.892) 
-0.158 
(0.897) 
Average Wage £20-
25k 
     0.262 
  (0.567) 
 
 0.285 
 (0.566) 
0.325 
(0.566) 
Average Wage £25-
30k 
    0.291 
 (0.899) 
 
0.273 
(0.900) 
0.334 
(0.902) 
      
R2 0.011 0.220 0.221 0.225 0.225 
Sample Size 442 442 442 442 442 
2-Digit Industry N Y Y Y Y 
5-Day Prior Return N Y Y Y Y 
Size Quintiles N Y Y 
 
Y Y 
        
 
   
 
 
 
        
 
  
Notes: The dependent variable is the five-day cumulative abnormal return, CAR(A,5), using the CAPM 
model. NMW are our sample of 20 firms with average wage less than £15,000. NMW High Wage Bill 
Shock are the 10 NMW firms with the highest wage bill as a percentage of total cost. NMW Low Wage 
Bill Shock are the other ten firms in the NMW sample. NMW Low Lerner Index are the 10 NMW firms 
with the lowest gross profit margins and NMW High Lerner Index are the other ten firms in the NMW 
sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. We also control for foreign exposure with a dummy equal 
to one if the majority of firm employment (or sales) is outside the UK.  
** denotes significance at 1 percent level; * denotes significance at 5 percent level. 
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TABLE 5. THE NATIONAL LIVING WAGE EFFECT ON FIRM PROFITS   
 
 
  
Baseline Firm 
 
10 Percent Increase in 
Minimum Wage  
(30 Percent Minimum  
Wage Workers) 
 
 
10 Percent Increase in 
Minimum Wage  
(40 Percent Minimum 
Wage Workers)  
    
Sales 100 100 100 
Wage Bill 18.6 19.3 19.6 
Other Costs 53.9 53.9 53.9 
Gross Profit 27.5 26.8 26.5 
Operating Profit 8.7 8.0 7.7 
Pre-Tax Profit 6.0 5.3 5.0 
    
Present Value of Pre-Tax Profits 206 180.5 170.9 
    
Percent Decline in Firm Value 
(Permanent) 
 -12.4 -17.0 
    
Decline in Firm Value (Hit to 2020, 
Thereafter No Effect) 
 -1.6 -2.3 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: Column 2 assumes a 3 percent real interest rate, 4 percent rise in wage bill (resulting from a 10 
percent minimum wage increase, assuming 30 percent of workers are NMW workers). Column 3 assumes 
a 5.5 percent rise in the wage bill (resulting from a 10 percent minimum wage increase, assuming 40 
percent of workers are NMW workers). If, rather than a 10 percent increase, the minimum wage increase 
is graduated as a path of 7 percent, 9 percent, 11 percent and 12 percent increases to get to the £9.00 per 
hour target in 2020, the calculation turns out to be almost identical. 
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Appendix 
 
This Appendix gives details on: the named NMW firms we study; the 2015 budget 
measures; statements about the NLW made by companies in our sample in their 
company accounts; Tables and Figures containing additional results. 
 
A. List of National Minimum Wage Firms By Sector 
 
Bars and Restaurants 
 
Greene King plc 
J D Wetherspoon plc 
Marston’s plc 
Mitchells & Butlers plc 
The Restaurant Group plc 
 
Retail 
 
Apparel 
Next plc  
 
Broadline 
B&M European Value Retail 
Debenhams plc 
Marks and Spencer Group plc 
Home Retail Group plc 
 
Food 
McColl’s Retail Group plc 
WM Morrison Supermarkets plc 
Greggs plc 
 
Home Improvement 
Dunelm Group plc 
 
Specialty 
Card Factory plc 
Game Digital plc 
Poundland Group plc 
WH Smith plc 
 
Services 
 
Business Support 
Mitie Group plc 
 
Recreational 
Cineworld Group plc 
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B. Budget 2015 Measures 
 
In addition to the National Living Wage announcement, the budget contained the 
following measures (HM Treasury, 2015): 
 
1. A rise in the tax-free personal allowance from £10,600 (2015/16) to £11,000 
(2016/17). 
2. Raising the threshold for higher-rate marginal income tax from £42,385 
(2015/16) to £43,000 (2016/17). 
3. Removing the family home from inheritance tax liability. 
4. Reducing the tax-free amount of pension contributions for those earning more 
than £150,000. 
5. Eliminating the ability of individuals to permanently claim non-domicile 
status for tax purposes. 
6. Reforming the welfare system by (a) freezing many benefits in nominal terms 
for four years, (b) reducing the cap on household total benefit claims to 
£20,000 per year, (c) requiring 18-21 year olds claiming benefit to move on to 
an apprenticeship or start work within 6 months of claiming. 
7. A real terms increase in the Defence budget for the remainder of the 
Parliament. 
8. Reforming dividend tax credit to favour those with smaller dividend income. 
9. The main rate of corporation tax will be cut to 19% in 2017 and 18% in 2020. 
10. Annual investment allowance confirmed at £200,000 per year. 
11. A rise in employment allowance (from £2,000 to £3,000), which provides an 
offset to employer national insurance contributions. 
12. Insurance premium tax rises from 6% to 9.5%. 
13. Restricting tax relief for wealthier landlords. 
14. Reforming the taxation of banks with a gradual move toward taxing profits 
rather than balance-sheet size. 
15. A levy of 0.5% (from 2018) on all firms paybill to fund 3 million new 
apprenticeships.  
16. 30 hours of free childcare for 3 and 4 year olds from 2017 – increased from 15 
hours. 
17. Student maintenance grants to be replaced with loans. 
18. Reform of the road tax system. 
19. Public sector pay increases limited to 1% per annum for the next four years. 
20. A crackdown on tax evasion and non-compliance. 
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C. Firm Responses to NLW 
 
Up to April 2016, the following nine companies in the sample we study have published 
half-year or full-year company accounts, including statements about the National 
Living Wage: 
 
1). Next plc  
 
Half-year results, 10 September 2015 
 
“NEXT’s total UK wages, at circa £600m, represent 15% of our sales. Of these, about 
£100m relates to those who would qualify for the NLW. Our adult starter rate will 
already be £7.04, so the increase to £7.20 in 2016 is manageable. We estimate the cost 
of implementing the NLW next year will be £2m. 
 
Looking beyond 2016, we estimate that the cost of the further rises in the NLW to 2020, 
over and above the rate of general wage inflation, will be £27m per annum. Of this, 
£11m relates to the wages of those who will be paid the NLW. The remaining £16m is 
the knock-on effect of maintaining wage differentials for supervisors, junior managers 
and other more skilled or demanding roles within the business (such as specialist call 
centre work). 
 
The £27m additional NLW cost is not immaterial but, in the context of NEXT’s wider 
cost base, is not transformative. We estimate that we would need to increase prices by 
around 1% to compensate for this cost which, taken over four years, is unlikely to have 
a material effect on the trading performance of the business. It should be noted that this 
is probably a pessimistic view of the required price rise, as we have assumed no 
improvements in productivity. In reality, we hope to be able to compensate for some 
wage inflation through increased productivity measures throughout the business.” 
 
2). Debenhams plc 
 
Full-year results, 22 October 2015. 
 
Cash impact £3m in FY2016, £8m in FY2017 (total wage bill = £345m). Both estimates 
include the cost of maintaining pay differentials.  
 
“We anticipate that in the context of our continuing investment in systems and 
infrastructure and our focus on operational effectiveness, productivity gains will 
mitigate the majority of this impact on our P&L in these years” 
 
3). Marks and Spencer Group plc 
 
Half-year results, 4 November 2015 
 
“The new NLW rate will be £7.20 per hour effective from 1 April 2016, and as our 
permanent customer assistant rate is already £7.41, we do not expect any short term 
impact on our staffing costs”. 
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4). Home Retail Group plc 
 
Half-year results, 21 October 2015 
 
“It is anticipated that, without any actions to mitigate the increases in wages attributable 
to the new NLW, the associated FY17 group cost increase would be around £15m.” 
(total wage bill = £581m). “The Group will look at all opportunities to mitigate an 
element of this NLW cost increase through its existing operational excellence cost 
efficiency programmes.” 
 
5). WM Morrison Supermarkets plc 
 
Full-year results, 10 March 2016. 
 
“In September we announced an increase in hourly pay for in-store colleagues, to £8.20 
from a previous minimum of £6.83. We are recognizing the contribution of our 
excellent and dedicated colleagues, who are fundamental to the Morrisons turnaround. 
As announced, the extra investment will be £40m, and more than 90,000 staff will 
benefit across all age brackets. The new rate is £1 per hour above the National Living 
Wage that is to be introduced from April 2016” (total wage bill = £1.728bn). 
 
6). Greggs plc 
 
Half-year results, 29 July 2015 
 
“The proposed increases to the minimum wage are likely to drive inflationary pressure 
in the broader sector over the coming years. We have consistently paid rates of pay 
above this level, with our standard rate for hourly-paid shop staff at £7.11, currently 
nine per cent higher than the national minimum wage. We are assessing the medium-
term impact of further increases on our business” 
 
7). Poundland Group plc 
 
Half-year results, 19 November 2015. 
 
“Although Poundland is not a minimum wage employer, we need to maintain pay 
differentials when new rates are introduced. Without mitigation, the increase in wages 
attributable to the new NLW is estimated at £4.3m in the 2017 financial year” 
 
“We are mitigating this additional cost. We have accelerated investment in the current 
year in productivity including the trial of hybrid self-scanning checkouts, new sales 
based ordering systems, shelf ready packaging, the installation of LED lighting and 
other operational measures. We will spend an additional £2m this year in these areas, 
as we seek to fully mitigate the additional costs of the NLW.” 
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8). WH Smith plc 
 
Full-year results, 15 October 2015. 
 
“In July, the government announced the introduction of the NLW from April 2016. We 
anticipate the impact of it in the 2015/16 financial year to be slightly over £1m for the 
Group, with around two-thirds of the cost impacting the High Street business. While 
identifying the impact is complex, we have calculated that without any actions to offset 
the impact, the additional annual cost across the Group would be around £2-3m, or 
around 0.5% of the Group’s total cost base each year. As with all inflationary pressures, 
we will look to offset these increases through our existing pipeline of initiatives, as well 
as identifying further opportunities for improved productivity and efficiency.” (total 
wage bill = £189m). 
 
9). Mitie Group plc 
 
Half-year results, 23 November 2015 
 
“We are positive about this move [introduction of NLW], which ensures that those of 
our people who are affected, are better rewarded and feel more motivated to do the jobs 
they do. It will also improve retention rates across our business.” 
 
“The areas of our business that are impacted by this change are single service contracts 
in cleaning, a small area of security, catering and healthcare. One third of the contracts 
in these areas of the business come up for re-tender each year, and all work bid or re-
bid since July 2015 onwards has factored in the NLW increases. Many contracts in the 
group have wage rates above this level”. 
 
“We also believe that this is an important move for the outsourcing industry, as it affects 
all competitors equally and creates a level playing field in terms of bidding. We do 
expect outsourcing prices to increase in the future and will not be advocating job cuts 
in reaction to this change. However we will continue to work with clients to identify 
cost efficiencies in other areas.” 
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D. Additional Tables 
 
 
TABLE A1.  ESTIMATES OF MEAN DAILY CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
 
(1) 
CAPM Model   
  
          
(2) 
4-Factor Model 
 
 
 
(3) 
Industry-Matched 
Model  
 
 
Panel A: NMW Firms – Post-Announcement 
 
CAR(A,1)    -1.428** 
 (0.523) 
 
   -1.516** 
 (0.542) 
   -1.693** 
 (0.564) 
CAR(A,2)   -1.799**   -1.967**   -2.465** 
 (0.608) (0.620) (0.709) 
    
CAR(A,3)   -1.661**   -1.823**   -2.553** 
 (0.617) (0.612) (0.660) 
    
CAR(A,4)  -1.533* -1.639*   -2.774** 
 (0.656) (0.656) (0.773) 
    
CAR(A,5)   -2.131* 
 (0.917) 
 -2.231* 
(0.910) 
   -3.047** 
(1.235) 
    
CAR(A,10)   -2.268* 
 (1.128) 
 
 -2.464* 
(1.165) 
   -3.241** 
(1.370) 
 
Panel B: NMW Firms – Pre-Announcement 
 
  
CAR(-1,A) -0.327 
 (0.512) 
 
-0.357 
 (0.533) 
-0.368 
 (0.520) 
CAR(-5,A)   0.500 
  (0.800) 
0.402 
(0.805) 
 
0.767 
(0.832) 
 
CAR(-10,A)  1.647 
 (0.934) 
 
1.523 
(0.963) 
0.768 
(0.904) 
    
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: CAR(A, Y) denotes the cumulative abnormal return from announcement time on July 8th (A) to close 
on day Y, where Y is relative to 8th July. There are 20 firms in the NMW sample. Panel A reports results 
for the post-announcement period and Panel B reports results for the pre-announcement period.  
** denotes significance at 1 percent level; * denotes significance at 5 percent level. 
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TABLE A2. ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF DAILY CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL 
RETURNS 
 
 
(1) 
CAPM Model   
  
          
(2)  
4-Factor Model 
 
 
 
(3) 
Industry-matched 
Model 
 
    
Mean    -2.131* 
  (0.917) 
 -2.231* 
(0.910) 
   -3.047** 
(1.235) 
    
Median   -1.148* 
  (0.563) 
  -1.358** 
(0.510) 
 -2.213* 
(1.125) 
 
Trimmed Mean     -1.343** 
  (0.394) 
  -1.392** 
(0.395) 
 
    -2.444** 
 (0.658) 
 
Negative Return Count   15* 
(5, 14) 
  15* 
(5, 14) 
  15* 
(4, 14) 
 
    
          
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: Estimates are for the five-day cumulative abnormal return, CAR(A,5) for the NMW stocks. The 
trimmed mean excludes the two largest and two smallest returns. Negative Return Count is the number of 
stocks (out of 20) that have a negative five-day CAR (with the empirical 95 percent confidence interval 
below). ** denotes significance at 1 percent level; * denotes significance at 5 percent level. 
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TABLE A3. REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF TEN-DAY ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
 
 
(1) 
          
(2)  
 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
 
(5) 
 
 
 
NMW    -2.268* 
  (1.101) 
 
  -2.540* 
 (1.136) 
    -2.676* 
   (1.220) 
 
  
NMW High Wage 
Bill Shock 
     
 
     
 
     
 
  -4.723* 
 (1.995) 
 
      
NMW Low Wage 
Bill Shock 
 
      -1.001 
  (1.242) 
 
 
NMW Low Lerner 
Index 
    -4.945* 
(2.064) 
      
NMW High Lerner 
Index 
    -0.518 
(1.050) 
      
Average Wage £15-
20k 
     
 
 -0.321 
  (1.012) 
 
-0.334 
 (1.005) 
-0.269 
(1.010) 
Average Wage £20-
25k 
   -0.934 
  (0.751) 
 
-0.903 
 (0.749) 
-0.842 
(0.750) 
Average Wage £25-
30k 
    0.615 
 (1.115) 
 
0.601 
(1.117) 
0.676 
(1.116) 
R2 0.021 0.267 0.271 0.275 0.277 
Sample Size 442 442 442 442 442 
2-Digit Industry N Y Y Y Y 
10-Day Prior Return N Y Y Y Y 
Size Quintiles N Y Y 
 
Y Y 
        
 
   
 
 
 
  
Notes: The dependent variable is the ten-day cumulative abnormal return, CAR(A,10), using the CAPM 
model. NMW are our sample of 20 firms with average wage less than £15,000. NMW High Wage Bill 
Shock are the 10 NMW firms with the highest wage bill as a percentage of total cost. NMW Low Wage 
Bill Shock are the other ten firms in the NMW sample. NMW Low Lerner Index are the 10 NMW firms 
with the lowest gross profit margins and NMW High Lerner Index are the other ten firms in the NMW 
sample. We also control for foreign exposure with a dummy equal to one if the majority of firm 
employment (or sales) is outside the UK. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
** denotes significance at 1 percent level; * denotes significance at 5 percent level. 
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TABLE A4. REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
       
  Five-Day 
CAR 
  Ten-Day 
CAR 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
       
NMW Sample 
 
 
 
NMW Exposure 
 
 
 
R2 
Sample Size 
2-Digit Industry 
5-Day Prior Return 
Size Quintiles 
  -2.773** 
(1.071) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     0.303 
299 
Y 
Y 
Y 
 
 
 
 
 
 -9.370* 
(4.571) 
 
 
0.296 
299 
Y 
Y 
Y 
 
-2.318* 
(1.080) 
 
 
  -5.789 
(4.499) 
 
 
0.308 
299 
Y 
Y 
Y 
-2.848* 
(1.327) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.348 
299 
Y 
Y 
Y 
 
 
 
 
  -13.512* 
    (5.288) 
 
 
       0.352 
        299 
          Y 
          Y 
          Y 
-2.059 
 (1.309) 
 
 
-10.355* 
(5.229) 
 
 
0.357 
299 
Y 
Y 
Y 
 
Notes: From ASHE and ABS sample. The sample size is 299 of the original 442 firms (with 22,304 
workers) as we lose firms for two key reasons. First, some firms are listed on the London Stock Exchange 
but the holding company is not UK-domiciled. These firms do not appear in the ABS as the sampling 
frame is only UK-registered companies. We lose 99 companies as a result. Second, as the ASHE wage 
data is only a 1 percent sample, some firms do not have any workers recorded in the data. The dependent 
variables are the five- (and ten-) day cumulative abnormal return using the CAPM model. NMW 
Exposure is the percentage of workers in the firm that earn within 5p on the National Minimum Wage in 
the ASHE sample for the firm. NMW Sample is a dummy variable for those of our sample of 20 NMW 
firms with average wage less than £15,000. Robust standard errors in parentheses.24 
 
** indicates significance at the 1% level; * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
24 We also experimented with a wage-gap measure that estimates for each firm the rise in the wage bill 
implied by simply increasing the hourly wage of all those aged 25 and over up to the new £7.20 level. 
The estimated coefficients (se) were -41.654 (22.926) and -64.515 (26.002) for the five- and ten-day 
results respectively. The mean of this wage-gap measure is 0.005 for all firms and 0.030 for the minimum 
wage sample. 
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E. Additional Figures 
 
 
Figure A1:  
Gap in Returns On Budget Day and 24 Hours After The NLW Announcement 
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Notes: Based on 442 FTSE All-Share Index (excluding investment trusts) quoted firms, 
comprising the 20 NMW firms and 422 Non-NMW firms.  The 20 NMW firms are listed in the 
Appendix. 
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Figure A2:  
Frequency Distribution of Abnormal Returns From May 1 to Budget Day 
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Notes: Based on 442 FTSE All-Share Index (excluding investment trusts) quoted firms, 
comprising the 20 NMW firms and 422 Non-NMW firms.  The 20 NMW firms are listed in the 
Appendix. 
